|By Fisher Investments Research Staff, 11/26/2013|
With interest rates on everything from savings accounts to junk bonds at or near generational lows, many income-seeking investors are looking for creative or, to some, exotic means of generating cash flow. Some are turning to a relatively little-known type of security—master limited partnerships (MLPs). MLPs may attract investors for a number of reasons: their high dividend yields and tax incentives, to name a couple. But, like all investments, MLPs have pros and cons, which are crucial to understand if you’re considering investing in them.
MLPs were created in the 1980s by a Congress hoping to generate more interest in energy infrastructure investment. The aim was to create a security with limited partnership-like tax benefits, but publicly traded—bringing more liquidity and fewer restrictions and thus, ideally, more investors. Currently, only select types of companies are allowed to form MLPs—primarily in energy transportation (e.g., oil pipelines and similar energy infrastructure).
To mitigate their tax liability, MLPs distribute 90% of their profits to their investors—or unit holders—through periodic income distributions, much like dividend payments. And, because there is no initial loss of capital to taxes, MLPs can offer relatively high yields, usually around 6-7%. Unit holders receive a tax benefit, too: Much of the dividend payment is treated as a return of capital—how much is determined by the distributable cash flow (DCF) from the MLP’s underlying venture (e.g., the oil pipeline).
When the Fed kept quantitative easing (QE) in place last week, US investors weren’t the only ones (wrongly) breathing a sigh of relief. Taper terror is fully global! In Emerging Markets (EM), many believe QE tapering will cause foreign capital to retreat. Some EM currencies took it on the chin as taper talk swirled over the summer, and many believe this is evidence of their vulnerability—with India the prime example as its rupee fell over 20% against the dollar at one point. Yet while taper jitters perhaps contributed to the volatility, evidence suggests India’s troubles are tied more to long-running structural issues and seemingly erratic monetary policy—and suggests EM taper fears are as false as their US counterparts.
The claim QE is propping up asset prices implies there is some sort of overinflated disconnect between Emerging Markets assets and fundamentals—a mini-bubble. Yet this is far removed from reality—not what you’d expect if QE were a significant positive driver. Additionally, the thesis assumes money from rounds two, three and infinity of QE has flooded into the developing world—and flows more with each round of monthly Fed bond purchases. As Exhibit 1 shows, however, foreign EM equity inflows were strongest in 2009 as investors reversed their 2008 panic-driven retreat. Flows eased off during 2010 and have been rather weak—and often negative—since 2011.
Exhibit 1: Emerging Markets Foreign Equity Inflows
With investors expecting the Fed to end quantitative easing soon, the yield spread is widening—fuel for stocks! Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images.
Since 1932, the average S&P 500 bull market has lasted roughly four and a half years. With the present bull market a hair older than the average—and with domestic and global indexes setting new highs—some fret this bull market is long in the tooth. However, while bull markets die of many things, age and gravity aren’t among them. History argues the fundamentals underpinning this bull market are powerful enough to lift stocks higher from here, with economic growth likely to continue—and potentially even accelerate moving forward as bank lending increases.
|By Christo Barker, 10/10/2013|
While the rest of the country fretted over taper terror, government shutdown and debt ceiling limits, the Federal Reserve tested its Fixed Rate Full-Allotment Reverse-Repo Facility (a mouthful—let’s call it FARRP) for the first time September 24. FARRP allows banks and non-banks, like money market funds and asset managers, to access Fed-held assets—i.e., the long-term securities bought under the Fed’s quantitative easing—via securities dealers’ tri-party repo (and reverse-repo) market for short-term funding. (More on repos to follow.) FARRP aims to address what many feel is a collateral shortage in the non-bank financial system caused by too much QE bond buying concentrating eligible collateral on the Fed’s balance sheet, where it doesn’t circulate freely. As a result, many private sector repo rates turned negative. But, should FARRP be fully implemented, the facility could actually hinder some assets (in this case, high-quality, long-term collateral like bonds) from circulating through the financial system—much like quantitative easing (QE) locked up excess bank reserves. A more effective means of freeing collateral in the repo market is tapering the Fed’s QE.
Repurchase agreements, or repos, are used to generate short-term liquidity to fund other banking or investment activity—a means to move liquidity (cash) from one institution to another. In a repo, one party sells an asset—usually long-term debt—agreeing to repurchase it at a different price later on. A reverse repo is, well, the opposite: One party buys an asset from another, agreeing to sell it back at a different price later. In both cases, the asset acts as collateral for what is effectively the buyer’s loan to the seller, and the repo rate is the difference between the initial and future sales prices, usually expressed as a per annum interest rate. The exchange only lasts a short while—FARRP’s reverse repos are overnight affairs to ensure markets are sufficiently funded. In the test last Tuesday, the private sector tapped the facility for $11.81 billion of collateral—a small, but not insignificant, amount.
FARRP’s first round is scheduled to end January 29, and during that time, non-bank institutions can invest between $500 million and $1 billion each at FARRP’s fixed overnight reverse-repo rates ranging from one to five basis points. A first for repo markets: Normally, repo and reverse-repo rates are free-floating, determined by market forces. Another of FARRP’s differentiating factors is private-sector need will facilitate reverse-repo bids instead of the Fed. Ideally, FARRP’s structure will encourage unproductive collateral to be released back into the system when it’s most needed—and new sources of collateral demand may help ensure this. Swaps, for example, are shifting to collateral-backed exchanges due to Dodd-Frank regulation—meaning more collateral will be needed to back the same amount of trading activity. Collateral requirements for loans will likely also rise.
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|By Matthew J. Belvedere, CNBC, 08/27/2014|
MarketMinder's View: By our count, there is more than one theoretical or factual error per paragraph in this “theory” (and we use that term loosely, as we’ll explain).
1) It incorrectly defines a correction—a decline of 50-60% is a bear by basically anyone’s definition.
2) Offers absolutely no explanation for the cause.
3) Bases the prediction near entirely on mean reversion (a behavioral error) and charts of past price movement (not predictive at all, ever). The entire reason for bearishness offered? Stocks are near all-time highs.
4) The charts are greatly distorted (please review the Y-axes), and they start from a wholly arbitrary point.
5) Trend lines are only trend lines after the fact. They aren’t predictive.
6) It attempts to tie the cause to monetary policy (withdrawal of QE), but markets are already well aware of this and have continued rising. Markets move in front of events, and we are a wee bit skeptical investors will, en masse, wake up one day and say, “Hey! Nine months ago the Fed began tapering! Sell!”
7) If you watch the video (which we did for you), you’ll find the analysis claims the Dow is in a 20-year uptrend, glossing over the cyclical changes in between.
8) Any theory containing a big bearish call and statements like, “It’s tough to know what the exact catalyst will be” is not actually a theory. It is an effort to get you to tune in.
|By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, The Wall Street Journal, 08/27/2014|
MarketMinder's View: 2008 was a rough time to be sure, but there are next to no econometrics that actually support this statement. In the Depression, headline unemployment was reportedly over 25%; deflation was rampant and persistent instead of fleeting and shallow as it was in 2008; GDP fell by about a third. Thousands of banks failed in the Depression, and there was no deposit insurance or other program to protect imperiled savers. Now, in this way the two are similar: The Fed’s actions (or inactions) played a key role in exacerbating both downturns. In the Great Depression (1929-1933), the cause of the deflation was the Fed sucking about a third of the money supply out. In 2008, it was the Fed outsourcing crisis management to the Treasury, who countered the impact of FAS 157 with haphazard policy that led to credit markets freezing. As Bernanke said on Milton Friedman’s 90th birthday, “Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we (the Federal Reserve) did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” We’ve seen the Fed deliver no mea culpa on 2008 as yet.
|By Matthew Lynn, The Telegraph, 08/27/2014|
MarketMinder's View: First, a bit of a disclaimer: none of the words that follow these words should be interpreted as an endorsement or indictment of the Conservative or Labour parties. Or any other party. Investors often figure a pro-business party is better for stocks, but cycles swamp party stripes—and are fully global, which shows the problem with this thesis. After all, US stocks are among the world’s strongest, and the US president is from the party more Americans equate to being less business-friendly—and that fact holds historically in the US. Which shows this for what it is: correlation without causation—no-no time for investors. In our view, if stocks favor anything politically, it’s gridlock, which most of the world’s highly competitive, major economies have.
|By Robbie Whelan, The Wall Street Journal, 08/27/2014|
MarketMinder's View: Don’t wait for the regulators to get around to doing something, just start shunning nontraded, unlisted real-estate investment trusts now. They’re costly, illiquid and not at all transparent. Unlisted doesn’t equal price stability, despite how some pitch these. Consider: When one nontraded REIT discussed here listed on the NYSE in 2013, it listed “at a price that worked out to be a 45% discount to the share price at which investors originally bought into it.” Prices are moving even if you can’t see them. Just like, you know, real estate. Ultimately: We have yet to hear a reasonable, logical argument for why nontraded REITs are a thing. In our view, they should probably not be a thing in your portfolio, though.
Market Wrap-Up, Tuesday Aug 26 2014
Below is a market summary (as of market close Tuesday, 08/26/2014):
Global Equities: MSCI World (+0.2%)
US Equities: S&P 500 (+0.1%)
UK Equities: MSCI UK (+0.6%)
Best Country: Portugal (+2.0%)
Worst Country: Hong Kong (-0.6%)
Best Sector: Energy (+0.6%)
Worst Sector: Utilities (-0.4%)
Bond Yields: 10-year US Treasurys rose .01 to 2.40%
Editors' Note: Tracking Stock and Bond Indexes
Source: Factset. Unless otherwise specified, all country returns are based on the MSCI index in US dollars for the country or region and include net dividends. Sector returns are the MSCI World constituent sectors in USD including net dividends.